In delineating the legal boundaries of capacity to consent to sexual touching law makers and jurists must grapple with tensions between sexual liberty, morality, sexual minority equality interests, and public safety. Legal rules that stipulate that an individual cannot consent in advance to unconscious sexual activity, or that an individual under a certain age or with a particular intellectual capacity cannot consent to sexual touching have an impact on sexual liberty and should be justified. In this sense defining legal capacity to consent to sex throws into relief the tensions between sexual liberty and the protection of sexual integrity. This is true across jurisdictions, regardless of the substantive definition of consent adopted by a particular legal system. This paper argues that establishing these limits based on normative assessments about specific sexual acts poses too great a threat to the liberty interests of women and sexual minorities. A better approach is to accept that in sex, as is probably true of all complex human interactions, an accurate application of the definitional turns on the particular. Context is everything. No sexual act, including one that objectifies, is inherently harmful. The paper offers an alternative approach by suggesting that laws defining capacity to consent should be justified on the basis of assessments of risk rather than moral assessments about sex. This stands to circumscribe law's limits on sexual liberty in ways that are better for women and sexual minorities. What this approach does not resolve is the paradox presented by the reality that while sex is inherently contextual criminal laws prohibiting violations of sexual integrity cannot be applied contextually. The paper explores how a recent legal ruling in Canada denying the capacity to provide advance consent to unconscious sex reveals this paradox. The discussion concludes by asserting, through the lens of queer theory, that the failure of law to exclude morally inculpable unconscious sex between ongoing sexual partners reveals the limits of law and in doing so suggests the need to re-evaluate the law's conception of the relationship between sexual liberty and sexual integrity.
developing an approach to addressing incapacity among mentally disabled women that appropriately protects both their sexual autonomy and their safety from sexual violation. 5 The discussion in this paper is developed in part by examining a legal ruling in Canada that denies capacity to consent in advance to unconscious sex. There are countless other examples. The law's relationship to each of these sexual contexts presents similar challenges. In delineating the legal boundaries of capacity to consent to sexual touching law makers and jurists in every jurisdiction grapple with the tensions between sexual liberty, morality, sexual minority equality interests, and public safety. While much of the focus of this discussion is on capacity to consent in advance to unconscious sex, its insights pertain to the legal regulation (through capacity to consent rules) of any sex at the fringes.
Unavoidably a law that denies capacity to legally consent to a particular sexual act also impacts individual liberty. A legal rule that denies capacity to consent to a particular sexual act circumscribes sexual liberty by depriving individuals of the ability to legally engage in sex that they might desire. Legal rules that stipulate that an individual cannot consent in advance to unconscious sexual activity, or that an individual under a certain age, or with a particular intellectual capacity cannot consent to sexual touching have an impact on sexual liberty. They remove the ability of sexual actors to engage in certain types of otherwise consensual sexual activity without some risk of criminal liability. This is true regardless of the substantive definition of consent operative in any particular jurisdiction. Any legal rule that impacts on the liberty interests of individuals is significant and its implications should be examined. It is important to pay attention to how these rules are rationalized.
The justifications for imposing legal rules that limit capacity to consent to sexual touching are often different than is the justification for the legal rule prohibiting unwanted sexual touching.
The rationale for legal rules criminalizing unwanted sexual contact involves a (relatively) straight forward relationship between the rule defining consent and the objective of protecting autonomy. 6 Laws limiting capacity to consent have a more complicated relationship to the protection of sexual liberty than do laws establishing the definition of consent. To be clear, all legal rules delineating consent to sexual contact are underpinned by an interest in protecting some concept of autonomy. 7 However, an autonomy based rationale for such rules can be analyzed in different ways. The basic prohibition on unwanted sexual touching as articulated by the definition of consent to sexual touching is justified on the basis that forced sexual contactas with any interference of one's bodily and sexual integrity -is a violation of autonomy. 8 One approach to justifying a law that denies capacity to consent to a particular sex act is on the basis that the sex it prohibits is non-autonomous. A drawback to this approach is that it requires demarcating between autonomous and non-autonomous sex. This is a requirement that tends to engender normative claims about particular sexual acts and relationships. Justifications premised on normative assertions about sex itself are not as compelling for those that do not accept that certain types of sexual acts or relationships are inherently harmful or immoral. Moreover, the manner of justification can have implications for other legal denials of capacity to consent to sexual acts. One alternative conceptual framework through which to analyze and justify rules 6 The rationale for the rule is straightforward. The application of the rule delineating between wanted and unwanted sex is complicated and contested. that prohibit otherwise consensual sex is rooted in the concept of risk. That is to say, instead of asserting that legal rules denying capacity protect autonomy by prohibiting non-autonomous sex one might argue that these rules aim to protect autonomy by prohibiting a certain level of risk of non-autonomous sex.
The decision to deny capacity to consent in advance to unconscious sex was a controversial one in Canada. 9 This is unsurprising. The case would surely also have been controversial in the United States, the United Kingdom, or Australia 10 -all countries that share with Canada a legal heritage and some similarities in terms of their consent laws. 11 For some, the denial of capacity in this context placed too great a limit on sexual liberty. 12 Despite the compelling position of those who critiqued the decision's impingement on sexual liberty, the argument developed below supports the conclusion that, at law, an individual cannot consent in advance to unconscious sex.
The paper also suggests that it is better to understand this limit on sexual liberty as a rule aimed at regulating risky sex not as a rule aimed at prohibiting exploitative sex. (The distinction between risk of exploitation and exploitation itself will be addressed in Part II). The discussion concludes by asserting that the failure of law to exclude morally inculpable unconscious sex 9 Karen Busby provides a detailed review of all of the contemporaneous media on the case in "Every Breath between ongoing sexual partners reveals the limits of law and in doing so suggests the need to re-evaluate the law's conception of sexual integrity.
The paper is divided into three parts. Part I examines the difficulties with justifying legal rules denying capacity to consent to sex on the basis that they prohibit exploitative sex. Drawing on a discussion of the legal response to other types of consensual "rough sex" -what is sometimes described as consensual sadomasochism -Part I suggests that the way in which a legal denial of capacity to consent to sex is justified has important implications for minority sexual liberty interests. Part II explores a justification for legally denying capacity to consent to sex in some circumstances that is centered on the concept of risk. This approach avoids making universal normative assessments about sex itself. However, as discussed in Part III, it does not provide a solution to the problem of capturing through capacity to consent rules some sex that is non-exploitative, mutually desired, and potentially consistent with human flourishing. Part III considers the implications of a failure to exclude from the criminal law's purview mutually desired unconscious sex between ongoing sexual partners. Relying on queer and feminist theories, Part III argues that this failure should be understood as an opportunity to re-think the relationship between sexual liberty and the law's role in protecting sexual integrity.
I. Avoiding Normative Assessments of Sex Itself Better Serves Women and Sexual

Minorities
In The trial judge convicted despite her recant on the basis that "her evidence that she consented to it, or was okay with it, when she regained consciousness has no bearing." If the legal conclusion is that "it is a criminal activity to engage in sexual activity with a person who is unconscious" then the complainant's evidence with respect to consent has no bearing. 15 R v JA, 2010 ONCA 226, 100 OR (3d) 676. 16 The specific issue of capacity to consent to rough sex, discussed in Part II of this paper, was not actually before the Court in J(A). For a helpful discussion regarding problematic aspects of the procedural and evidential conduct of this case see Karen Busby, supra note 9. 17 R v JA, supra note 1 Chief Justice McLachlin's decision might fairly be characterized as quite narrow. While she does suggest that this definition of consent is in harmony with the policies underlying the consent provisions of the Criminal Code, for the most part, she anchors her analysis in the language of legislative intent and deference to Parliament. She also asserts that "in the absence of a constitutional challenge, the appropriate body to alter the law on consent in relation to sexual assault is Parliament, should it deem it necessary" (ibid at 65 23 Some readers may have difficulty with drawing a distinction between ongoing sexual partners and those whose initial sexual contact is while one of them is asleep or intoxicated. Again, it is important to be clear that unwanted sex -sexual violation-between ongoing sexual partners is both common and should not be distinguished from, or receive different legal treatment than, unwanted sex between strangers. The drunken and sleepy sex between partners referred to here is limited to sexual touching which is desired (but properly non-consensual under J.A.). The distinction between ongoing sexual partners and strangers is drawn because presumably desire for this type of sexual interaction more frequently occurs in the context of ongoing relationships. This is an unsupported empirical assumption. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that unconscious sex between new sexual partners could never be desired by all parties.
itself harmful in some respect. For the rule established in J(A) the argument would be that unconscious sex is by its very nature exploitative and therefore a violation of autonomy -that initiating sex while one's partner is asleep constitutes a violation of that individual's autonomy because it is exploitative. The law ought not to recognize consent to unconscious sex because "sexual activity is an activity where both parties are supposed to be physically present and feeling something that is mutually pleasurable or desired in some sense." 24 Both (or all) parties to a sexual encounter ought to be awake. 25 Proponents of this position would point to the fact that in a case like J(A) there was no indication that the complainant ever choked the accused into unconsciousness and then used his body to sexually gratify herself. 26 The argument is that to allow prior consent to sexual activity when a woman is unconscious perverts the concept of autonomy because it perpetuates the discriminatory belief that female sexuality exists solely for the pleasure of men 27 -to treat a woman as a sexual object is to violate her autonomy. In other words, sexual objectification is exploitative.
This reasoning relies on an assumption about the relationship between sex and mutuality. that only sex involving this notion of mutuality is autonomous. That is to say, the rule can be justified in this way if one accepts that all unconscious sex is exploitative. The difficulty with this approach is that it requires making a particular normative assessment about the specific sexual activity at issue. This is not compelling for those who reject the assertion that all unconscious sex is exploitative. must not be applied relationally, the good of sex is nevertheless contextual. Arguably sexual activity, including sexual objectification, is not inherently harmful. 32 Abhorrent conduct in one context may be a "wonderful part of sexual life" in another. 33 "In the matter of objectification, context is everything." 34 Not every instance of sex or sexual desire that is solely self-regarding constitutes a violation of autonomy. It would be sophomoric to suggest that only sex and desire that is other regarding is autonomous. Why must one be someone to everyone rather than sometimes something to someone?
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There is a second, perhaps more important, reason to be wary of legal regulation that is premised on normative assessments about sex itself. Legal rules justified on the basis of universal normative assessments about sex itself may be protective of majoritarian attitudes about sex in a way that is not good for women and sexual minorities.
ii. Universal Normative Claims About Sex Itself Reinforce Majoritarian Sexual Morality
Advance consent to unconscious sex is not the only sexual activity for which legal rules establishing the parameters of capacity are necessary. A consideration of the legal regulation of sadomasochistic sex (S/M) illustrates the disadvantages of conceptualizing and justifying legal rules denying capacity to consent to sexual touching on the basis of normative assessments about the specific sexual activity at issue. Although the law must recognize individual freedom and autonomy, when the activity in question involves pursuing sexual gratification by deliberately inflicting pain upon another that gives rise to bodily harm, then the personal interest of the individuals involved must yield to the more compelling societal interests which are challenged by such behavior.
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Under leading precedent in Canada when the infliction of pain is in pursuit of sexual gratification the interests of the individual must yield. However, when the infliction of pain is in pursuit of a hockey puck the calculation is different. This is troubling not because of the discrepant value placed on individual liberty in the context of these two endeavours but because the discrepancy is premised on an assessment of the social worth of sex (and in particular a specific type of sex).
Fortunately, in recent cases in which the issue of S/M is raised courts have avoided applying the social utility principle articulated in Welch/Jobidon. Karen Busby conducted an extensive review of Canadian case law since 2005 in which the issue of S/M was raised. She found that in 36 The majority in J.A. does not address the issue of consensual sado-masochistic sex. However, the Court may have been attuned to the decision's possible impact on the liberty interests of those engaged in types of sadomasochistic sex beyond unconscious sex. The Court stated, at 65, that: "In the absence of a constitutional challenge, the appropriate body to alter the law on consent in relation to sexual assault is Parliament, should it deem this necessary." This may have been noted with a view to the issue of consensual sadomasochistic sex. 37 Supra note 1. 38 R v Jobidon, supra note 1. 39 The Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's charge to the jury in Welch, supra note 1 at 18, "Because it is not in the public interest that people should cause each other bodily harm for no good reason, consent is no answer to a charge of sexual assault causing bodily harm, when actual bodily harm is objectively foreseeable and caused…."
all of the cases, except two involving homicide, the issue was did the complainant consent to the sex at issue not can the complainant consent to the sex at issue. 40 It is difficult to understand why that wasn't the approach in Welch.
The complainant in Welch alleged that the sexual contact was non-consensual. She testified that she screamed and begged the accused to stop, that he pulled a knife on her, tied her down, and forced her to engage in the sexual activity at issue. 41 The trial judge told the jury that consent was irrelevant in this case because under Canadian law individuals cannot consent to the types of activities engaged in by the accused and the complainant. He concluded that individuals cannot consent to these activities "because it is not in the public interest that people should cause each other bodily harm for no good reason." 42 The activities engaged in by the accused involved tying the complainant to the bed using a scarf and a tie; hitting the complainant's breasts three times with a belt; penetrating her vaginally with his penis; using baby oil to lubricate her and then penetrating her vaginally with his finger and anally with the handle of a spatula. 43 If engaged in without consent, as the complainant in Welch alleged was the case, this conduct amounts to a horrendous, violent sexual offence. 44 However, when engaged in with consent "the good reason" for tying one's sexual partner to the bed, spanking their breasts with a belt, pouring baby oil on them and penetrating them vaginally and anally with body parts and other objects shouldn't be categorically dismissed. Surely sexual pleasure is as important to the pursuit of self-fulfillment as is hockey? Even in Canada. 40 Busby, supra note 9 at 346. 41 Supra note 1 at 6,7,8. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 This should have been a case about rape not sexual liberty. It is hard not to speculate on whether there were evidentiary or procedural issues in this case that made it impossible to make a finding of non-consent.
In addition to diminishing the importance and benefit of sexual pleasure, this approach privileges dominant cultural, social, and religious practices and norms. In turn, this reinforces the very social infrastructure that produces the "relations of force" 45 [2007] BCWLD 1131, in which the accused was charged with the sexual assault of his girlfriend (and pled guilty to assault) after they engaged in cutting as part of their sexual interactions. Both the accused and his girlfriend, sixteen at the time, were "fascinated by the subculture of sadomasochism." (at 4). On one occasion, at her request, he cut her with a razor blade. On another he scratched his initials in her back and on a third encounter he cut a pentagram on her back. Charges were laid after the complainant's mother observed a scar on her daughter's back. The complainant refused to participate with the prosecution. In sentencing the accused the Court stated, at para 11 that "the plea to common assault presupposes criminalize particular sexual activities, as queer men who were sexually active in Canada prior to 1968 would be apt to point out.
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Women should be concerned about legal rules regulating sex that are based on whether the sexual activity promotes approved social purposes or produces socially desirable cultural products. 49 As with legal reasoning that characterizes some sexual acts as presumptively exploitative, the "approved social purposes approach" in Welch and Jobidon presents the problematic potential for reasoning based on conclusions about the sexual morality of particular sexual acts. The decision to criminalize a sexual activity should not be based on whether it has gained approval in Canadian society. A legal approach to capacity to consent that is premised on an assessment of whether the act is of social utility requires evaluating the inherent "good" of a particular sexual act. Moral assessments of sexual acts rather than sexual contexts and relationships tend to reinforce majoritarian sexual morality. Legal rules aimed at promoting or protecting dominant sexual morality lend themselves to discrimination against sexual minorities 50 and women. 51 Women (a significant number of whom will experience forced sex at and accepts that, at least where adolescents are concerned, consent cannot be given to this kind of assault, even though agreed to and encouraged by the complainant "victim". While body piercing and tattooing are accepted in this society, disfigurement by way of scarification has not gained approval in Canadian society, even though access to the practices of the subculture is readily available even to adolescents." The Court granted a conditional discharge in this case in part on the basis that the accused (despite now being an adult) was no longer engaging in sadomasochistic activity. 48 55 This is an important point. Some of those that defend the rule in J(A) on the basis that unconscious sex is exploitative might agree that it is because our social, political, and legal context is steeped in gendered inequality that it is inherently exploitative to treat women as sexual objects. In other words, they might agree that if the social context were different (more equitable) treating women as sexual objects would not always be exploitative. 56 Busby, supra note 9. 
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A legal approach not premised on normative assessments about the inherent value or harm of any sexual act is less susceptible to the types of social biases that discriminate against women and other disadvantaged groups -social biases such as those that produced different legal treatment for vaginal and anal sex, 59 marital rape immunity 60 and morally motivated legal prohibitions on the commodification of sex. 61 A legal approach to S/M the objective of which is to assess and prohibit certain levels of risk avoids these difficulties.
If the law is to deny capacity to consent to a particular sexual act it should be because that has had a discernible impact on the legal response to the violation of sexual integrity of, in particular, intoxicated complainants. 65 Removal of marital rape immunity for husbands 66 and adoption of the attitudinal definition of consent for the purposes of the actus reus of the offence promise better protection for the sexual integrity of wives and girlfriends.
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These are legal developments that must be guarded rather than eroded. In Canada's legal context it is not possible to recognize a contextually contingent application of consent without eroding these safeguards against marital rape immunity and discriminatory applications of implied consent.
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In this sense the risk to the administration of justice posed by a legal definition that would recognize advance consent between ongoing sexual partners in some contexts is too great. Risky sex carries more than one connotation. The risk assessment required should include risk to the individuals engaged, risk to other sexual actors and risk to broader shared interests such as the administration of justice.
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In emphasizing the need to avoid a relational approach to consent, it is important to note the distinction between the definition of consent and the application of the definition of consent. 69 This would not make the law's treatment of capacity to consent to sex different in principle than its regulation of other activities that impact individual interests and shared goods. Risk assessment, for example, is part of the law of negligence, mortgage and pension law, and other areas of criminal law. The factors that go into risk assessment in the context of capacity to consent involve both individual and shared interests -such as a shared interest in the protection of sexual integrity. Consider other types of risky sex. One example, credit for which should be attributed to the guest editors of this journal, involves adolescents in care facilities. Assume such individuals face a heightened risk of sexual violation both within and outside of the home. Based on the argument developed here and given this risk, should it not be made legally impossible for adolescents in care to give valid consent? The answer is no. There is no reason to assume that recognizing the capacity of adolescents in care to engage in consensual sex raises the likelihood that they will experience more non-consensual sex. Recognizing their capacity to consent to sex poses no obvious risk to the administration of justice and the legal protections in place to guard against the sexual violation of adolescents in care or others. The impossibility of denying capacity to consent in advance to unconscious sex without capturing all seriously drunken sex between partners or all sex initiated while one partner is asleep cannot be addressed through the concepts developed to respond to over breadth in law. captures activity that should not be captured its overreach can often be responded to through reading down or carving out an exception to the rule. 74 In other words, the line can be redrawn. 75 There is no way to respond to the sleeping spouse issue by carving out an exception. If the line is drawn at unconscious sex, as it should be, then sex initiated with a sleeping partner and sex with a seriously drunk partner fall on the criminal side and it is impossible to re-draw the line without risking revival of the spousal rape exemption.
II. Denying Capacity to Consent to Sex that Is Too Risky
Assume you agree that the law should not recognize advance consent to unconscious sexthat sex with an unconscious person should be legally non-consensual. Assume it is also the case that in certain contexts, circumstances not possible of legal delineation, this unconscious sex is mutually desired and experienced as in some sense pleasurable by all participants -that it is nonexploitative and therefore consistent with the promotion of sexual integrity and human 74 In the constitutional law context reading a law down is really just an interpretive exercise which aims to interpret laws consistent with the presumption of constitutionality (Peter Hogg, prohibits the possession of child pornography -that is any visual representations that show a person who is, or is depicted as, under the age of 18 years and is engaged in, or is depicted as engaged in, explicit sexual activity and visual representations the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction for a sexual purpose of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person who is under the age of 18 years. In response to what they concluded was an overly broad definition, the Court carved out exceptions. The Court found that the provision should be read so as not to cover written material or visual representations (i.e. drawings) created and held by the accused alone solely for his or her personal use nor should it be read so as to cover visual recordings created by or depicting the accused that do not depict the accused committing unlawful sexual acts and are held by the accused exclusively for private use.
flourishing more broadly. Is there a way to justify this legal rule denying capacity to give advance consent to unconscious sex without accepting that unconscious sex (or sexual objectification) is always exploitative?
One option is to conclude that the aim of this law is to allocate risk within a risky sexual context and that unconscious sex is sufficiently risky (to individuals and to our shared interest in sexual integrity) such that the rule is not overly broad. Defending the legal denial of capacity to consent on the basis that it is too risky avoids categorizing all unconscious sex as exploitative. A conceptual approach that justifies denying capacity on the basis of risk allocation avoids making universal normative claims about particular sexual acts. That is the difference between purporting to prohibit exploitative sex and placing limits on acceptable risk of exploitative sex.
This, as discussed above, is better for women and queers. (However, as discussed in Part III, an approach that rationalizes the rule based on risk assessment does not avoid having to concede as unjust a legal moment of impossibility regarding an approach to consent that continues to be an important if modest victory for feminists.)
The majority reasoning in J.A. is consistent with this rendering of the legal rule denying capacity to consent in advance to unconscious sex. The majority's reasoning can be interpreted as follows: consent for the purposes of the actus reus of sexual assault means that the complainant subjectively experienced a decision to consent which was contemporaneous with the sexual touching. This is necessary because the possibility of unconscious sex, even if consented to in advance, creates unacceptable vulnerability to exploitation. Thus the concept of consent for the purposes of sexual assault law must include an ongoing and contemporaneous capacity to revoke.
Chief Justice McLachlin's main, and most compelling reason, for rejecting the defence's sleeping spouse argument centered on concerns regarding the sleeping spouse's vulnerability to exploitation. She concluded that there was a risk that the unconscious person's wishes would be innocently misinterpreted by his or her partner and thus unintentionally violated. 76 Chief Justice
McLachlin determined that the sleeping spouse argument fails to recognize "the total vulnerability of the unconscious partner and the need to protect this person from exploitation".
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She suggested that this also raises an evidentiary concern because the complainant will be unable to know for certain what precisely occurred while he or she was unconscious. "Only one person really knows what happened during the period of unconsciousness, leaving the unconscious party open for exploitation." 78 The concern articulated here is not that having sex with someone who is unconscious presumptively exploits them but rather that it exposes them to a legally unacceptable level of risk of exploitation. Following this reasoning, unconscious sex should be non-consensual at law not because it is itself exploitative, but because of the particular conditions of vulnerability it presents -conditions of vulnerability which necessitate legal protection of a contemporaneous ability to withdraw consent. Were it possible to remediate those conditions then unconscious sex and the potential objectification instigated by it should, from a legal perspective, be fine.
There are risk factors specific to the individual as well as broader social factors that support denying capacity to consent to this type of sexual activity. The individual conditions of vulnerability with respect to unconscious sex, unlike for example unconscious surgery, 79 stem 76 Supra note 1 at 60. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid at 61. 79 This analogy between surgery (which one obviously can consent to in advance) and unconscious sex was drawn favorably by the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal in its decision to recognize capacity to consent in advance to unconscious sex. See R v JA, supra note 15 at 63.
from the lack of administration or bureaucracy around consent to sex as well as the possibility that more so than with respect to surgery, 80 every sexual act is different depending on the precise context, at the precise moment it occurs, and the manner in which the touch is effected. 81 It may be less possible to consent in advance to sex than to surgery because with respect to sex one cannot ever know in advance to what one is consenting. Consent to sexual touching is profoundly incremental. There is also the risk that consent will be exceeded either intentionally or unintentionally without the knowledge of the unconscious individual. 82 Presumably, if there were some method by which the unconscious participant could revoke consent the unacceptable level of exposure to vulnerability would not be present and it would no longer be necessary to legally deny capacity to consent to this type of sex. That is to say, sex with an unconscious person, absent the conditions of vulnerability relating to inability to revoke, would not be problematic. The formality and administrative infrastructure for securing informed consent developed in the medical context is inapt in the sexual context. The justification for denying capacity to consent in advance to unconscious sex is that the level of exposure to vulnerability is too high and the mechanisms for alleviating these conditions of vulnerability are not readily available. As such, the legal rule denying capacity can be said to allocate some risk away from the unconscious participant. 81 The example Chief Justice McLachlin gave of this was as follows: "If the accused fails to perform the sexual acts precisely as the complainant would have wanted -by neglecting to wear a condom for instance -the unconscious party will be unintentionally violated" (R v JA, supra note 1 at 60). Arguably, the example of the decision to use or not use a condom fails to capture the level of nuance that is at issue regarding consent to sexual interactions where one party in an ongoing sexual relationship is asleep. That is to say, the distinction between consenting to protected and unprotected sex is fairly obvious. More nuanced are distinctions between the nature of the touch, the degree of pressure, etc. 82 "Hilary Young", supra note 80 at 288. As Young notes, this is less of a risk with the sleeping spouse -who would presumably wake up -then with respect to intoxicated or unconscious individuals.
A theory of capacity to consent based on risk allocation should not be limited to stereotypes and myths about women and sex, the adversarial nature of the legal system, the individualized rather than systemic response structure of the criminal justice system, and dysfunctional and moralistic social attitudes about sex generally. Denial of capacity to consent to unconscious sex allocates risk away from the administration of justice. It avoids expansion of the mistaken belief in consent defence or reinvigoration of implied consent arguments. That is to 83 Gotell, supra note 17; Nicola Lacey, "Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity and Criminal Law" (1998) 47 CJLJ 6. 84 Gotell, ibid.
say, denying legal capacity to consent to unconscious sex places risk of criminal liability on individuals rather than adopting a legal rule that would be vulnerable to misuse by defence lawyers in cases where the sexual contact was not mutually desired.
Rules of risky sexual engagement should always allocate risk in ways that recognize the impact of systemic inequities on individual sexual actors. For example, the legal rule regarding age of consent should continue to be a bright line rule. Inter-generational sex below a certain age should be prohibited, but not based on an assumption that it is always exploitative, or that the very act of it is always morally wrong. A bright line age of capacity to consent to sex should be enforced because the prolific mistreatment of children in this society, combined with the inability of legal and social systems of surveillance to offer adequate prevention, response and protection in circumstances of mistreatment, create conditions of vulnerability that make it too risky for children to have sex with adults. Any debate about the issue of inter-generational sex should be about what age to draw the line not whether to draw one. Conversely, under a conceptual framework that justifies denying capacity to consent on the basis of risk allocation, laws like the criminal prohibition on incestuous sexual intercourse should be re-considered. The rationale for these laws has been discredited by some feminist and queer legal scholars. 85 Given that other that this rule gives rise to the possibility of injustice should not be made with contrition. Nor should it be limited to the compelling and important assertion that this legal rule denying capacity is justified on the basis that it prohibits sex that is too risky. There is another way to think about this failure to tailor the law.
III. Sharing Sexual Integrity and Queering the Law's Failure
Failure, according to Judith Halberstam, can serve as a mechanism for "undoing the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development with the goal of delivering us to orderly and predictable adulthoods."
93 She argues that "failure is a way of refusing to acquiesce to dominant logics of power and discipline, and as a form of critique…that presents an opportunity rather than a dead end." 94 This last section of the paper focuses on the failure of the law of consent to accurately account for the nuance of sexual engagement. It does so not in order to justify this failure but to acknowledge the opportunity it brings.
Feminists should be unapologetic about this moment of impossibility in law and instead seize upon the opportunity it offers to talk about consent and sexual integrity in a different way. This rule's failure to exclude from the scope of the criminal law a good deal of sex that is mutually desired and thus potentially consistent with human flourishing is also a failure to delineate obvious and tidy boundaries upon which male sexual aggression can confidently self-regulate. This is promisingly disruptive.
There is more. The space between law and justice revealed by the criminalization of this type of mutually desired, non-exploitative sex between ongoing partners also exposes the dysfunction of a criminal legal process that cannot be trusted with the discretion that a contextual, relational agreement." 99 The problematic result, she suggests, is that "[n]ormative sexual interaction is reconceived as being like an economic transaction and good sexual citizens are reconfigured to resemble rational economic actors assuming responsibility for their actions and the risks that they take." 100 As a result individual women who take risks are held responsible for their own violation and the power structures embedded in the sociality that produces sexual violence remain in place.
There is a further element to the opening provided by this site in law where reason runs. It is an opportunity to re-think sexual liberty. "Under certain circumstances, failing…may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world." 101 The impossibility of tailoring this law of consent in a way that excludes from the criminal law's reach a potentially significant amount of desired, non-exploitative sex provides a platform from which to argue that everyone bears the responsibility for promoting the social, political, and legal conditions that will make sex safer and to argue that the failure to do this reveals a dysfunctional social context or community. This is a circumstance that imposes (sexual liberty) costs on everyone. 102 It is an opportunity to understand sexual freedom as about distributing power through collective engagements with the particular relations of force and interdependencies that structure the social context in which sexual violence is produced. 103 Freedom, unlike individual sovereignty, might be understood as a "reaching out to the world that is accomplished through collective projects rather than solely an individual consciousness achieved alone." 104 In this way, sexual liberty (as one component of sexual integrity) could be framed as a shared interest inpromoting greater social, economic and political equality such that sexual diversity could safely flourish. Instead of advancing arguments about diminished sexual agency, false consciousness, or the inherent immorality of some types of sex -arguments that devalue women's desire and the importance of sexual adventure and diversity -feminists should shrug their shoulders in the face of this failure (this space between law and justice) and suggest that law stop looking for happy endings. Embrace the failure. The cost to sexual liberty incurred by the injustice of criminalizing mutually desired, non-exploitative and potentially pleasure producing sex is an unavoidable side effect of a social context in which gender, race and class based conditions of vulnerability and relations of force make sex a weapon of choice for oppression. The freedom to engage in risky sex requires conditions for the promotion and protection of sexual integrity (understood as a shared interest). This requires renovating and dismantling these relations of force. The criminal law is an insufficient tool with which to pursue this objective. Constructing sexual assault law in a discourse of hope perpetuates oppression by celebrating the very system that gives meaning (and thus power) to the inequitable legal and social divisions between women and men, queers and non-queers, the promiscuous and the chaste, aboriginals and nonaboriginals…. 105 Failures offer a way to take a detour around the usual markers of accomplishment, satisfaction (and justice). "Rather than resisting endings and limits, let us instead revel in and cleave to all of our own inevitable fantastic failures." 106 Let these moments of legal inadequacy float uncomfortably but resoundingly and unapologetically within the ocean of (sexual) injustice in which they swim. 105 Halberstam, supra note 93 at 107 made this point in discussion of the relationship between the concepts of futurity and nationalism: "ffuturity signifies the nation, the divisions of class and race upon which the notion of national belonging depends, and the activity of celebrating of the ideological system that gives meaning to the nation and takes meaning away from the poor, the unemployed, the promiscuous, the non-citizen, the radicalized immigrant, the queer…." I am borrowing her analysis and applying it in the context of law. 106 Ibid at 187.
Conclusion
Defining legal capacity to consent to sex throws into relief the tensions between sexual liberty and the protection of sexual integrity. This is true across jurisdictions, regardless of the substantive definition of consent adopted by a particular legal system. Establishing these limits based on normative assessments about specific sexual acts poses too great a threat to the liberty interests of women and sexual minorities. A better approach is to accept that in sex, as is probably true of all complex human interactions, an accurate application of the definitional turns on the particular. Context is everything. No sexual act, including those that objectify (and possibly even those that exploit depending on one's definition of mutuality) is inherently harmful.
As such, laws defining capacity to consent should be justified on the basis of assessments of risk rather than moral assessments about sex. This stands to circumscribe law's limits on sexual liberty in ways that are better for women and sexual minorities. What this approach does not resolve is the paradox presented by the reality that while sex is inherently contextual criminal laws prohibiting violations of sexual integrity cannot be applied contextually.
The issue of capacity to provide advance consent to unconscious sex reveals this paradox.
The law of consent in Canada captures what might be a good deal of desired and nonexploitative unconscious adult sex. It creates an entire category of morally inculpable sexual assault. This result is an unavoidable by product of a dysfunctional society in which trust in our legal and social institutions as well as our sexual relationships -certainly a necessary condition for the promotion of sexual integrity as a shared good -is ill advised. This is not a hopeful and happy solution. It is an inchoate, depressingly pragmatic response to a broken community. In recognition of that lies failure's opportunity.
